Dan Berkenstock, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, has been giving a lot of thought to the growing importance of the moon in global politics, especially the rivalry between the US and China. His interest stems from personal experience—his grandmother took a photo of Neil Armstrong's moon landing in 1969, a picture he still keeps on his desk. During college, working at NASA’s Johnson Space Center, he met some of the legendary figures from the Apollo era, which left a deep impression on him. He explains that three major trends are pushing the lunar surface into the spotlight: China’s rise as a strategic competitor, the shift of advanced tech development from government labs to private companies, and humanity's ever-growing demand for energy and computing power. Of these, China's ascent is the most urgent issue. The prestige tied to lunar achievements is a huge motivator for China, giving the US a fresh, national space policy focus after decades of relative quiet. When asked why countries would want a permanent presence on the moon, Berkenstock points beyond mere prestige to the moon's potential as a source of clean and scalable energy. He highlights helium-3, a rare isotope found in lunar soil, which could fuel nuclear fusion reactors and meet humanity’s energy needs for thousands of years. This possibility could mark the first sustainable economic activity beyond Earth’s immediate orbit, opening up new frontiers in space commerce. The moon also presents a unique challenge compared to traditional geopolitical arenas. Since World War II, the US has dominated nearly every domain on Earth, enforcing a global commons that includes vital maritime trade routes. But the legal situation in space is much less clear. The Outer Space Treaty (OST) from the 1960s bans sovereignty claims over celestial bodies but lacks enforcement measures, making it essentially voluntary. This leaves a loophole whereby countries, including China, could withdraw from the treaty and claim lunar territory, potentially even the whole moon. Such a move would have major security implications, especially since the OST prohibits stationing nuclear weapons in orbit. At the same time, Earth’s orbits are getting crowded and contested, which complicates matters further. Another complication is the US’s current inability to project power on the moon. Unlike terrestrial domains, there's no clear military presence or response mechanism for lunar conflict. It’s even unclear which military branch would handle such a scenario, with the Space Force still defining its role. Is it more like the Marines with multi-domain combat capabilities, or more a coordinating body? This ambiguity adds to the strategic challenge. China’s lunar approach contrasts with the US’s fragmented and budget-limited strategy post-Apollo. China has woven lunar ambitions into its broader national strategy, aiming to boost prestige and showcase technological prowess. Both countries seek international partnerships—the US through the Artemis Accords, China via the International Lunar Research Station Initiative. However, US legislation like the 2011 Wolf Amendment restricts NASA and other agencies from collaborating with China, pushing China to pursue independent missions and development paths. Regarding potential conflict, Berkenstock points out that most people don’t realize the moon’s usable surface area is roughly 75% the size of the US, but only a small fraction of that is prime real estate. The legal ambiguity around resource ownership complicates matters—while the OST forbids national claims on territory, US law permits citizens to own and sell extracted space resources commercially. This conflicting stance could very well ignite disputes over lunar resources. Though he admits he’s not a legal expert, he sees this as a likely source of tension and possible conflict, no matter how intense or limited it may be.
